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Abstract
Using European Union funds involves a complex process; Member States must 
adhere to wide-ranging EU and domestic legislation, non-compliance can lead to 
irregularities. Besides accordance with the letter of the law, also the general EU 
budgetary principles, in particular sound fi nancial management, must be given full 
consideration. Th e paper presents Hungary’s evolving approach to handling irreg-
ularities and her experience in creating the corresponding legal and institutional 
framework. Th e research also assesses how the perspective of the European Com-
mission, in particular of its auditors, has contributed to legal uncertainties.
In the draft  legislation for the 2021 – 2027 budgetary period, the European 
Commission proposes a new requirement, namely the rule of law conditionality.3 
Its clarity and objectivity, however, are still being widely discussed. Additionally, 
cohesion policy conditionalities have always contained an obligation for the proper 
functioning of the institutions – including the courts. Nonetheless, the European 
Commission has not previously examined the performance of the courts in rela-
tion to proceeding irregularity and recovery disputes. Th e presented Hungarian 
case study not only explains the particular challenges that call for revisiting the ap-
peal system in Hungary; it warns of the general diffi  culties Member States may face 
when embedding the irregularity and recovery management functions into their 
national legislation, whereas the paper also gives notice to the long-awaited analysis 
of the root problems invoking irregularities.
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1. Introduction
In the period 2014 – 2020 Hungary receives over Euro 25 billion from the Europe-
an Structural and Investments Funds (ESIF), the legal and regular implementation 
of these funds bears critical importance. A key element is the ability to absorb EU 
funds for cohesion, which is defi ned as “the capability of a region or member state to 
allocate and to fully spend the fi nancial resources under cohesion policy in an effi  cient 
and eff ective way” (Dragan 2008; Horvat 2005); it measures the extent to which a 
state / region is able to fully spend the allocated fi nancial resources from the EU 
funds in an eff ective and effi  cient way (Kopeva et al. 2011). Governments deployed 
eff orts to prevent and manage the defi ciency of absorption capacity (Horvat and 
Maier 2004) and absorption bottlenecks (Kalman 2002).
Whereas there is a most extensive literature evaluating the implementation 
of Cohesion Policy, in comparison with its signifi cance, the functionality and key 
ingredients of its compliance enforcement regime have enjoyed examination at a 
somewhat lower intensity. Studies articulate the correlation between simplifi cation, 
compliance and performance (Davies 2015; Mike and Balás 2015), the importance 
of legal certainty in the fi nancial control and audit of the funds (Meuleman and 
Brenninkmeije 2017), the role of the accountability framework (Koedijk 2016) and 
the weight of administrative and institutional capacity (among others Šumpíková et 
al. 2005, Mendez and Bachtler 2017).
Unauthorised and irregular use of assistance in a project may undermine 
reaching its goals, moreover – at a programme level – it may divert aid from other 
important investments (Jurevičienė and Pileckaitė 2013). Detecting, investigating 
and sanctioning non-compliance tie up the delivery institutions greatly, and pend-
ing irregularities deepen programme-level fi nancial management risks. Th e impor-
tance of an adequate irregularity regime cannot be overstated. Global challenges, 
increasing political pressure, media4 and public attention have led to the continued 
tightening of general and irregularity-specifi c norms, compounded by a complete 
recalibration of the institutional set-up with each programming period in Hungary 
(Nyikos 2012), doubtless to be revisited for the post-2020 era.
Since the early 2000s, there has been a huge growth in the complexity of reg-
ulations, related directly or indirectly (e.g. horizontal policies) to Cohesion Policy 
implementation.5 Th is course has been driven signifi cantly by the intention to im-
prove fi nancial management and control of the funds (Davies and Polverari 2011) 
and characterised the blurring of hard law and soft  law, as evidenced in the broader 
EU governance context, too (Grazianoa and Halpern 2015). Benefi ciaries’ inability 
to capture and cope with the patchwork of rules spur frustration and resistance 
4 For the impact of media on the theme of irregularity see Triga et al. (YEAR).
5 Final conclusions and recommendations of the High Level Group on Simplifi cation for post 2020, 
https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/newsroom/pdf/simplifi cation_proposals.pdf.
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(Jouen 2008) and erode legality, as none of the conditions the OECD defi ned as a 
minimum factor to compliance (suffi  cient degree of knowledge of, willingness and 
ability to comply with the rules by the target groups; Parker 2000) materialised. Eu-
ropean Commission audits have played a critical role in the rising rigidity (Nyikos 
2011); the legal development of corresponding fi nancial corrections refl ect the aim 
of protecting compliance through deterrence (Łacny 2017). A study warned that 
uncorroborated audit fi ndings, when enforced through the ultimate power of fi nan-
cial sanctions, propel risk-evasiness, the introduction of further constraints thus 
reinforcing the viscious circle (AAM Consulting 2012). Pressure has also proven 
harmful in terms of encouraging more focus on procedures rather than on the un-
derlying content (Wostner 2007). Irregularities occur using EU funds in public pro-
curement and problems linked with cronyism, which are the key vulnerable areas 
where the corruption occurs (Suwaj 2005).
European legislation provides for the protection of the Union’s fi nancial inter-
ests in all aspects. An error is any breach of rules, an unintentional mistake which 
does not mean that funds have been lost, wasted or abused. Th e term is not covered 
by the antifraud norms.6 Irregularity means any infringement of a provision of Eu-
ropean law which has, or would have, the eff ect of prejudicing the general budget of 
the European Union or budgets managed by it. Non-compliant spending leads to a 
less effi  cient and / or eff ective use of public funds and it could cause damage to the 
budget. It is notable that breaches of both EU law and national law are relevant, and 
it is enough if there is a potential prejudice to the EU’s budget, it is not necessary to 
prove that an actual loss to the budget in fact occurred. A fraud implies intentional 
deception (Nyikos and Tátrai 2012), it aff ects the European Communities’ fi nancial 
interests and consists of7, in respect of expenditure, any intentional act or omission 
relating to:
• the use or presentation of false, incorrect or incomplete statements or docu-
ments which leads to the misappropriation or wrongful retention of EU budget;
• non-disclosure of information in violation of a specifi c obligation, with the same 
eff ect;
• the misapplication of funds for purposes other than those originally approved.
Th e concept of irregularity is much wider than that of fraud. Th e latter con-
stitutes a criminal act which is established by judicial proceedings. Th erefore, the 
6 For the employment of the term “error”, see the European Court of Auditors’ Annual Report of the 
European Court of Auditors on the implementation of the budget concerning the fi nancial year 
2009, OJ C 303 / 02, 9. 11. 2010. Because of the different methods to collect the data, the European 
Court of Auditors and the Commission agree that the fi gures of the European Court of Auditors on 
errors and of the Commission on irregularities and fi nancial corrections cannot be compared in a 
meaningful way (OJ C 303 / 02, 9. 11. 2010, point 1.50, 32, 33). On the methodology of the Court, 
see Annex 1.1 (Audit Approach and Methodology) OJ C 303 / 02, 9. 11. 2010, 34.
7 Article 1(1), point (a), of the “Convention on the Protection of the European Communities’ Fi-
nancial Interests” (PIF Convention).
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fi nancial damage of fraudulent practices can only be determined once the judicial 
procedure has come to an end. Th e legal defi nition and interpretation of irregular-
ities have aff ected the volume of cases, risks and the corresponding institutional 
setting. Th e construction of its meaning refl ects both that i.) provisions in the EU 
legislation have evolved over time and ii.) national governments may have expand-
ed the defi nition in the national legislation.
In the period 2004 – 2006 the Community law solely ruled on the EU budget 
interest. Also the interpretation of loss to the EU budget needed clarifi cation. Th e 
concept of actual loss enjoyed a widely shared understanding; it referred to an ir-
regularity which has only been detected aft er the reimbursement of the underlying 
expenditure was reimbursed from the budget. Consequently, the budget bore ex-
penses that it should not have paid for, due to their irregular nature. However, de-
fi ning a potential loss to the budget created many diffi  culties. Th is notion assumed 
that the breach of the rules could have theoretically aff ected expenditure paid by the 
budget. Th e interpretation of the term largely impacted the recording, investigat-
ing, reporting, correcting and recovering of irregularities. Neither the EU nor the 
Hungarian legislation defi ned the earliest starting point of a potential irregularity. 
Interpretation varied, some intermediate bodies took the date of the submission of 
the project proposal. Th is approach lengthened the process for a formal rejection 
of the application. Substantial diff erences prevailed in statistical data originating 
from Member States which held that an irregularity only relates to reimbursed ex-
penditure and must be confi rmed by relevant administrative / judicial proceedings 
and from countries that employed a much broader interpretation of an irregularity 
and also accomplished their investigations in a relatively short period of time under 
administrative proceedings.
Furthermore, as an additional complication, the practice set up for the Euro-
pean Rural Development Funds in Hungary greatly diverged from the mechanisms 
under the Structural and Cohesion Funds: an irregularity implied a formal admin-
istrative decision giving eff ect to the right to recover undue public assistance. Dif-
ferences across the funds became tangible. In a 2006 audit report8 Hungary, among 
various other Member States9, was suggested to address the “lack of clarity as to 
what constitutes an irregularity”. Additionally, the report warned of the need to dis-
tinguish between breaches of the norms with evidenced public fi nancial loss and 
violations with no impact on the budget.
8 2006 Report to the Contact Committee of the Heads of the Supreme Audit Institutions of the EU 
Member States and the European Court of Auditors.
9 CZ, D, E, I, LT, NL, PL, UK.
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A special case is an irregularity related to fi nancial instruments (FI)10; the lat-
ter support economically viable investments through loans, guarantees, equity and 
other risk-bearing mechanisms (Nyikos and Soós 2018). Th e possibility to re-invest 
the revolving funds off ers greater fl exibility. Th e fund manager can remove irreg-
ular items before the payment claim is sent to the European Commission. Th e un-
charged expense is recovered by the benefi ciary, nonetheless irregularity does not 
trigger loss at the closure of the instrument. Blending two types of fi nancial support 
(grants and FIs) implies that an irregularity in one component may aff ect progress 
in the other.
Th e research on the evolution of Hungary’s irregularity system is based on the 
relevant past and present legislation, literatures, evaluations and the experiences of 
the authors in order to collect and assess the relevant factors which may infl uence 
the results the use of EU Cohesion Policy funds bring about. Th e regulatory and 
institutional environment strongly aff ects the likelihood of irregularities; national 
and EU control and audit reports, irregularity documentation refl ect the actual oc-
currence, nature and impact of non-compliance cases. Information collection and 
validation rely on a range of further sources, including European and national reg-
ulations, offi  cial websites and annual reports, scientifi c literature, and last, but not 
least, a great array of interviews with Cohesion Policy experts.
Our method has been broken down into two steps. First, aft er the defi nition of 
irregularities we analysed the Hungarian regulatory, administrative and delivery re-
gime of the EU funds in the period 2004 – 2018. Special attention was given to the is-
sues linked to preventing and managing irregularities. In particular, changes in the 
government structure and adequate administrative capacity are looked at, followed 
by an analysis of their impact on Hungary’s eff ective use of EU funds (Nyikos 2013). 
Secondly, we examined the evolution of the relevant legal framework linked to EU 
funds and irregularities. We assessed the data on irregularities in order to mea-
sure Hungary’s performance and identify improvement needs, especially in light 
of the new “rule of law” initiative proposed by the European Commission. Where-
as the present study principally attempts to systemise the Hungarian experience, 
the relationship between compliance enforcement and the effi  cacy of EU-funded 
public policy interventions has received growing attention in both EU institutions 
and Member State, and it is placed high on the agenda of the 2021 – 2027 legisla-
tive proposal negotiations. Furthermore, the discourse is not confi ned to Europe; 
uncertainties regarding the legal basis of federal grant assistance (Walker 1997) or 
(non-compliance related) dispute settlement structures and procedures (Marque 
2011) constitute a reoccurring issue in the United States, as well.
10 Financial instruments are defi ned in Financial Regulation as measures of “fi nancial support pro-
vided from the budget in order to address one or more specifi c policy objectives by way of loans, 
guarantees, equity or quasi-equity investments or participations, or other risk-bearing instruments, 
possibly combined with grants”.
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2. The evolution of the regulatory framework in Hungary
Th is chapter off ers a brief overview of the evolution of both the general legal-in-
stitutional framework Hungary has adopted for implementing the EU Cohesion 
Policy and the irregularity system it has built up to deal with the irregular use of the 
funds. It explains the main considerations for the continued recalibration of this 
delivery environment, the steps the Hungarian Authorities had to take to resolve 
systemic problems, the result of these interventions, and it also presents noncom-
pliance handling issues yet to be resolved.
In the draft  legislation for the 2021 – 2027 budgetary period, the European 
Commission proposes a new requirement, namely the rule of law conditionality.11 
Its clarity and objectivity, however, are still being widely discussed. Additionally, 
cohesion policy conditionalities have always contained an obligation for the proper 
functioning of the institutions – including the courts. Nonetheless, the European 
Commission has not previously examined the performance of the courts in relation 
to proceeding irregularity and recovery disputes although Member States have met 
diffi  culties when they attempted to embed the irregularity and recovery manag-
ment functions in their national legislation.
Th is chapter summarises the evolution of national regulatory environment for 
irregularities. Domestic rules play a pre-decisive role in dictating the general legal 
relationship for the provision of fi nancial assistance including the handling of ir-
regularities and recoveries, assigning the corresponding rights and obligations to 
the fi nanciers (represented by the managing authorities) and benefi ciaries. Mean-
while the quality of the regulations (clarity, consistency, completeness) infl uences 
the solidity of decisions and enforcement of sanctions. Th e national legal basis has 
developed over the years; notably periodic re-examinations have been undertaken 
to incorporate the knowledge enriched by experience and to respond to the emerg-
ing problems the chapter will present. Nonetheless, the interplay of this public-law-
based legislative framework with civil law ruling the conclusion and satisfaction of 
grant contracts has generated growing diffi  culties for appeals.
2.1 General approach to managing the funds and irregularities
Th e Pre-Accession Funds paved the way for implementing Cohesion Policy via in-
stitutional capacity-building and modelling the implementation of the funds. Th e 
ex-ante controlled pre-accession system off ered little opportunity to pilot the han-
dling of irregularities under the shared management regime though. Th e National 
Development Plan of Hungary briefl y mentions the term; the 2004 – 2006 domestic 
regulations did not off er much detail either; minimum standards were only adopted 
in 2005. Perceived security came from excessive administrative rules, high collateral 
requirements, and long delays in public procurement processes, which postponed 
11 COM (2018)324 fi nal, Rule of law conditionality proposal.
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the recognition of varied interpretations.12 Furthermore, the delivery system had 
limited exposure to external audits. Th ese factors added up to a low level of risk 
recognition. Challenges were addressed case by case, as they arose, without the em-
ployment of systematic legal solutions.
Managing Authorities (MA) bore the general responsibility for implement-
ing the operational programme and, as part of it, managing the irregularity sys-
tem. Th ey had to secure funding for the repayment to the EU budget (from the na-
tional budget reserves) before recovery from the benefi ciary was accomplished.13 
Managing Authorities delegated many of their functions to the 22 intermediate 
bodies (IB) which essentially satisfi ed the project-level tasks including dealing 
with irregularities, too.
Th e winding-up body (an independent control body to audit the delivery 
system and projects), being the Government Control Offi  ce in Hungary, was lim-
ited to informing the managing authorities on suspected irregularities (5 – 15 % 
control checks); only later was it empowered to state irregularities. Th e Paying 
Authority (PA), in charge of certifying expenditure and submitting applications 
for payment to the Commmission, followed up fi nancial control and audit pro-
cesses and coordinated with the MAs and IBs. Th e OLAF Coordination Offi  ce 
collected information and reported on irregularities, meanwhile off ering guid-
ance and training to help recognise potential fraud. Th e police, the prosecution, 
the courts and the Public Procurement Arbitration Board played an important 
role in the investigation, judgment and treatment of irregularities that fell under 
criminal law or the public procurement law.
When preparing for the period 2007 – 2013, a strong emphasis was placed 
on institutional and operational effi  ciency. Th e newly created National Develop-
ment Agency hosted all managing authorities, and the new national regulations 
laid down unifi ed standards for programme delivery. Irregularities received little 
importance initially. By the early 2010s their number rose alarmingly; intensifying 
EC audits strongly criticised Hungary’s failures to check and ensure that benefi -
ciaries comply fully with the public procurement rules (Nyikos and Tátrai 2012). 
Subsequent fi nancial corrections called for high-level intervention, managing ir-
regularities ceased to be treated as a technical matter. Th e new Government (2010) 
initiated a full-scale revision.
Th e organisation of political coordination14 was redefi ned. Managing author-
ities received reinforced responsibilities for directing and controlling a reduced 
number of IBs. A single set of implementing rules replaced the fragmented, ev-
12 Primary source of irregularities up to date.
13 As the CSF Managing Authority was in charge of the use of technical assistance monies related to 
the implementation of the CSF, its duties included corresponding recovery. A similar obligation 
was ascribed to the Cohesion Fund IB.
14 Assigned to the Minister responsible for national development.
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er-sprawling regulations. Th e provisions on irregularities were upgraded signifi cant-
ly, the introduction of the right to appeal bettered the substantiation of decisions. 
Besides, appalling diff erences in the recovery rate called for action. Principally the 
operational programmes15 which focused on public-sector target groups, where the 
techniques of direct reduction from the payment claim or direct collection16 were 
in place, progressed with the repayments satisfactorily. Th ey achieved a close to 
100 % recovery rate. Other programmes presented outstanding delays. Eventually 
the National Tax and Customs Administration was appointed to recover the funds 
as overdue tax reinforced by its right to “delete a company’s registration number”, 
this measure instantly terminates the trading of the fi rm.
For the 2014 – 2020 period a complete transformation of the delivery system 
implied that managing authorities and most intermediate bodies were reinstiuted 
into the line ministries.17 Sectoral policy responsibilities received crisp articulation 
in the new national regulations. Th e Minister in charge of the EU Funds was ap-
pointed to supervise implementation, supported by a Central Coordination Unit 
holding signifi cant powers. Th e Government decree18 passed in autumn 2014 com-
prises standardised implementing provisions, national eligibility rules and a unifi ed 
operational manual. Cutting red tape in collateral requirements necessitated that 
the means to recover the misused public funds are solidifi ed.
Detailed rules apply to the investigation and treatment of irregularities. Th e 
process always starts with an alert by an institution or offi  cial in the management 
and control system; the signal is then followed up by the managing authority. Th e ir-
regularity examination process may require coordination with external agencies or 
authorities and / or spur the discontinuation of the payment of fi nancial assistance. 
Th e decision whether compliance or rather the violation of the norms and fi nancial 
loss were evidenced rests with the head of the MA. Th e benefi ciary may request a 
re-examination; during the appeal process, save the halting of payments, the legal 
consequences are suspended. Depending on the nature of the case, the managing 
authority may waive the benefi ciary’s repayment obligation; in case of a negative 
appeal judgment, however, interest is charged on the unpaid “debt”.
2.2 Regulations for implementing the funds and handling 
irregularities
Irregularity provisions have always formed part of the broader Cohesion Policy 
regulation. For the period 2004 – 2006 multiple layers of regulations included gov-
ernment and ministerial decrees, OP-specifi c rules and operational manuals issued 
15 E.g. Electronic Administration, Public Administration Reform, Technical Assistance, Transport.
16 Direct charge of the benefi ciary’s bank account.
17 Some of the MAs (Public Administration, Rural Development) are hosted by the PMO.
18 Government Decree 272 / 2014. (XI. 5.) on the implementation of assistance from EU Funds in 
the programming period 2014 – 2020.
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by MAs and IBs. Th e involvement of multiple agencies with overlapping duties 
and continued modifi cation of the regulations created diffi  culties in maintaining 
a nationally consistent approach and precipitated the capacity of project promoters 
leading to higher compliance risks. Irregularity and recovery provisions were in-
complete19, supplementary rulings were only passed in March 2005. For the Euro-
pan Rural Development Funds, the authorisation of a government decree20, public 
administrative procedures formed the legal grounds for the receipt of EU funds.
For the period 2007 – 2013 the nature of the regulatory framework remained 
unchanged: fragmented rules and an institution system with more than 25 execut-
ing bodies and overlapping regulations led to tangible departures in legal interpre-
tation.
Th e complete mid-term revision encompassed the irregularity system.21 Ob-
servations included weaknesses of the multilevel regulatory environment; despite 
the legislative hierarchy neither legal dogmatics nor application of the rules evi-
denced the regulatory intent of coherence and legal consistency. Particular insuffi  -
ciencies contained the lack of
• clarity on institutional duties and their embeddedness in the national public and 
civil law systems,
• certainty on public authority power, legal nature of grant assistance limiting the 
right to appeal,
• defi ned authority of the courts in case public fi nancial assistance cases are tried,
• procedures for coordinating with bodies22 whose decisions impact23 on the reg-
ularity of the funds.
Th e rules required a full-scale process for all irregularities, even if the national 
regulations off ered suffi  cient clarity for closing down the case24 (e.g. liquidation, 
19 The Government fi rst adopted implementing rules for Cohesion Policy funds in January 2004. 
This fi rst piece of legislation laid down the institutional responsibilities for managing Structural 
and Cohesion funds in Hungary. The list of defi nitions shows an explanatory nature rather than 
purely quoting the EU legislation. Nonetheless, the defi nition of irregularities was excluded.
20 82 / 2007. (IV. 25.) Government Decree.
21 A comprehensive review of the regularity framework for handling irregularities under Structural 
Funds, prepared by the EX ANTE-MEGAKOM-ECORYS Konzorcium for the Coordination Manag-
ing Authority of the National Development Agency, July 2010.
22 The Public Procurement Arbitration Board formed an exception; the volume of non-compliance 
cases in the public-procurement domain had inspired the improvement and formalisation of 
working relations at an earlier stage.
23 E.g. Competition Offi ce, tax authorities, criminal courts.
24 Another important observation focused on the relationship between the management verifi ca-
tion and the irregularity systems. Empirical evidence, which was obtained for the preparation 
of the study, suggested that the irregularity system actually replaced underperforming fi rst-level 
control functions. This practice was strongly recommended to be brought to a halt in order to 
give way to the parallel upgrading of these two inter-related regimes.
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bankruptcy). At the closure of the 2004 – 2006 programmes, the buildup of a serious 
backlog came to the forefront.
Th e need to introduce substantial changes became inevitable. In 2010 a uni-
fi ed government decree25 was introduced, off ering a clear distribution of tasks be-
tween MAs and IBs, detailed provisions on public-procurement compliance checks, 
complaints and irregularities. Benefi ciaries could challenge decisions at any stage of 
the administrative process.
For the period 2014 – 2020 the Government radically recalibrated the pro-
gramming architecture, the legislative and institutional environment and enacted a 
new government decree26 in autumn 2014.
2.3 Legal relationship with the benefi ciary, the problem of the legal 
regime
Th e importance of the legal relationship between the benefi ciary and the manag-
ing authority lies in the guarantees it off ers for the enforcement of – fi nancial – 
sanctions, should an irregularity be established, whereas it also gives the right to 
benefi ciaries to challenge such a decision. Its terms and conditions derive from the 
governing legal regime, the eff ectiveness of which has a signifi cant infl uence on how 
these rights and obligations are fulfi lled. Problems, however, quickly become reoc-
curring, and legal diffi  culties multiply with the interplay of various legal regimes.
Legal issues related to the award, use and repayment of public fi nancial assis-
tance in Hungary are partly covered by administrative law and partly fall within the 
civil legal system with important overlappings.
Academic literature in Hungary has applied greater weight to the public 
source of law. Public-policy objectives spur public authorities to allocate fi nancial 
assistance via their redistributive functions; the recovery of aid is based on pub-
lic-fi nance law. Th e effi  cient and eff ective use of budget funding is in the public in-
terest, even if it takes the form of a private investment. Th erefore, public-fi nance law 
dominates the process, covering the award decision, release of assistance, reporting, 
recovery and fi nancial control.
However, the absorption of EU Funds has been accompanied by a dynamically 
growing array of support forms. Contractual arrangements are based on civil law 
with several elements from public fi nance law. Th is complexity negatively aff ects the 
25 4 / 2011. (I.28.) Government Decree on the use of assistance from ERDF, ESF and the Cohesion 
Fund in the programming period 2007 – 2013.
26 Government Decree 272 / 2014. (XI. 5.) on the implementation of assistance from EU Funds in 
the programming period 2014 – 2020.
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transparency of the legal structure of the relationship between the parties (fi nancier 
and benefi ciary27) and the application of the rules.
Th e legal relationship between the managing authority and the benefi ciary 
starts with entering into a legally binding agreement which may take the forms of i.) 
a grant contract, ii.) a grant letter and iii.) a public administrative decision.
In the period 2007 – 2013 the EARDF grant provider MA in Hungary acted 
as a public authority under administrative law, adopting public administrative de-
cisions, while the ERDF, ESF and Cohesion Funds MAs acted under civil law and 
issued grant contracts and grant letters.
For the ERDF, ESF and Cohesion Fund the contract which the two parties 
signed was governed by the Civil Code, from the day of its conclusion up to its 
termination. Th ese terms were clearly expressed in the 2007 – 2013 implementing 
provisions, doubtless as a reaction to the uncertainty the legal status of the grant 
contract had caused earlier. To simplify, managing authorities introduced and is-
sued grant letters as a one-sided act. A grant letter sets forth all the conditions at-
tached to implementing the funds, which the benefi ciary formally accepts through 
the submission of the grant application. Grant letters are regimented by civil, in 
particular contract, law, too.
Diff erent provisions applied to EARDF assistance in the period 2007 – 2013. 
Th e general rule dictated that the award of fi nancial support is based on a formal 
public administrative decision. Public administrative decisions must be public-au-
thority-related, namely determining rights or obligations for addressees, verifying 
data, facts or eligibility, maintaining offi  cial records and carrying out controls. Th e 
managing authority satisfi ed all these functions; moreover, a decision on an appli-
cation for fi nancial assistance implies the determination of rights and duties. Con-
sequently, the formal criteria for a public administrative proceeding were fully met.
Th e broader legal environment, the appropriate regulatory framework, gains 
utmost importance if a benefi ciary fails to fulfi l the contractual obligations or the 
misuse of funds is evidenced, triggering the recovery of public moneys. Th e legal 
status of the irregularity decision directly infl uences the right of the benefi ciary to 
challenge this decision as well as being a vital component for the effi  ciency of the 
corrective measures the managing authority puts in place.
In the EARDF regime when projects are approved via an administrative pro-
ceeding the law records the need to conclude an irregularity decision in the form of 
an administrative proceeding. Two procedures can be distinguished: i.) administra-
tive decision with immediate eff ect28, whereby no right of appeal is provided, enti-
27 Benefi ciaries portray a great variety of organisations like private companies, NGOs, civil organi-
sations and churches, public utility companies, ministries and government agencies, the territo-
rial administration and local governments.
28 Law XVII of 2007 Article 69 (7)–(8).
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tlement of the benefi ciary for fi nancial support terminates, entirely or partially, and 
ii.) withdrawal of the previous decision on the award of fi nancial assistance associ-
ated with the right to appeal; the outcome of the second-tier decision shall prevail.
Civil courts have inherent jurisdiction to try irregularity-related sanctions 
imposed on benefi ciaries. However, there was no uniform understanding of the au-
thority civil courts held in such cases and the position only started to be confi rmed 
by actual court practice in the early 2010s.29
Ambiguity in the legal provisions led to multiple interpretations regarding the 
position of the managing authority when it commences proceedings to formally es-
tablish the irregularity and deal with its consequences. Managing authorities argued 
that their co-ordinated, equal legal standing with the benefi ary within the grant 
contract does not convert into an identical relationship within irregularity disputes. 
Th eir duty to seek and guard the interest of the EU and national budgets, the 
obligations stemming from the EU legislation and imposed on them as functions to 
be satisfi ed by the national authorities, play out as essential drivers to their conduct. 
With the signature of the grant contract, the benefi ciary acknowledges and accepts 
the right of the managing authority to exercise power, including the establishment 
of irregularities and the enforcement of legal and fi nancial consequences according-
ly. Also jurisdictions contained opinions which noted that benefi ciaries obtained 
public funds through a call-for-proposals system, whereby all implementing condi-
tions derived from regulations. Th e autonomy of the benefi ciaries was thus limited 
to accepting or rejecting the contractual terms (and the funding off er).
Consequently, the relevant current Hungarian regulations state for every type 
of national public and EU funded assistance that the selection and the recovery / re-
pay process is based on the public-fi nance law with a civil contract concluded be-
tween the parties.
Th e update of the delivery terms for the EU funds extended to the challenge 
of the irregularity decision. A second tier to the irregularity system was introduced 
to address the request of benefi ciaries for an administrative review of the fi rst-level 
decision. As the appeal decision does not constitute a public administrative pro-
ceeding, the implementing decree does not entitle the benefi ciary to fi le an appeal 
against this second-tier decision (on the irregularity itself or the recovery of undue 
assistance) to the court. Nonetheless, on the consideration of the legal relation be-
tween the managing authority and the benefi ciary being governed by civil law, ben-
efi ciaries can fi le a civil lawsuit against the second-tier position. In this case, they 
29 Most relevant decisions: 1 / 2012 (XII.10.) KMK.-PK. Opinion EBH2010.2237, 2237 / 2010. Eco-
nomic Precedented Opinion, Supreme Court Gfv.IX.30.218 / 2011 / 7. Judgment.
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do not compel the decision itself but allege the cancellation of the grant contract30 
requesting the continuation of funding to the project.31
Th ese provisions are not in line with the rule of law and seem to be unconsti-
tutional as Hungary’s Fundamental Law (Article XXVIII) rules that “(1) Everyone 
shall have the right to have any charge against him or her, or his or her rights and 
obligations in any litigation, adjudicated within a reasonable time in a fair and public 
trial by an independent and impartial court established by an Act” and “(7) Everyone 
shall have the right to seek legal remedy against any court, authority or other admin-
istrative decision which violates his or her rights or legitimate interests.” Additionally, 
Article 25 (2) specifi es that “Courts shall decide on a) criminal matters, civil disputes 
and on other matters specifi ed in an Act.”
Th e rule-of-law principle dictates that benefi ciaries obtain the right to chal-
lenge the irregularity decision of the managing authority. Also the effi  ciency of 
the appeal regime determines the time required for settling a dispute and recover-
ing undue assistance. Court proceedings take many years, conserving uncertainty 
and feared to decrease the probability of an eff ective recovery. A performance 
audit by the National Audit Offi  ce32 of 2010 noted that settling an appeal took an 
average of 3 years.
Additionally, the status of Commission guidelines is yet unresolved, the na-
tional rules do not off er techniques for their treatment. As an example, the guidelines 
to be applied for irregularities related to public procurement defi ne the amounts 
and rates of fi nancial corrections (Nyikos and Sóos 2016). Although the guidelines 
do not constitute legislation, both the Commission services and Member State 
authorities have to adhere to them. Other concerns include their retroactive em-
ployment and legally expansive nature: the guidance must be based on EU law to 
provide clarifi cation for the practicacl implementation of the ruled. However, these 
guidances repeatedly go beyond the regulation.
30 E.g. Supreme Court Gfv.IX.30.218 / 2011 / 7 (First tier: Economic Collegium of Budapest 
Court 22.G.41.644 / 2007 / 38; Second tier: 4.Pf.31.997 / 2010 / 3); Budapest Regional Court 
of Appeal 3.Pf.20.373 / 2013 / 4. Judgment (First tier: Economic Collegium of Budapest Court 
25.G.40.350 / 2011 / 8);
• Budapest Regional Court of Appeal 17.Pf.20.050 / 2015 / 6. Judgment (First tier Economic Col-
legium Budapest Regional Court 19.G.40.366 / 2014 / 14);
• Budapest Regional Court of Appeal 9.Pf.20.015 / 2012 / 7. Judgment (First tier: Budapest Re-
gional Court 66.P.23.359 / 2011 / 9).
31 E.g. Budapest Regional Court of Appeal 16.Gf.40.152 / 2014 / 13. számú second tier judgment 
(First tier: Economic Collegium Budapest Regional Court 7.G.40.001 / 2013 / 6);
• Supreme Court Gfv.IX.30.334 / 2011 / 5. és Gfv.VII.30.179 / 2014 / 4. Judgments (First tier: Eco-
nomic Collegium of Budapest Court 19.G.40.704 / 2010 / 6, second tier: Budapest Regional 
Court of Appeal 9.Pf.20.303 / 2011 / 3 and 9. Pf.21.524 / 2012 / 3).
32 1010 Report on the audit of the irregularity, debt and recovery processes related to the use of EU 
Funds (2010) National Audit Offi ce.
126
The NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy, Vol. XII, No. 1, Summer 2019
2.4 Hungarian irregularity data and trends
Statistical data as of 31 January 2018 confi rm that documents-based checks con-
stitute the principal instrument to reveal irregularities (59 % of all cases). Timely 
investigation is essential to the pace of the recovery process. When an investigation 
confi rms full compliance in a project, the “return to normalcy” should take place 
instantly. Cases are very diff erent, of course. Certain types of issues take almost no 
time to process; highly complex, specialised problems require a longer examination. 
Th e maximum length of investigation dropped markedly over the years, concluding 
an irregularity takes less than a day in 20 % of the cases. Nevertheless, the average 
examination time remained unchanged.
Table 133
Timescale of irregularity examinations
31 December 2009 31 January 2018
Maximum (no. of days) 509 382
Minimum (no. of days) 4 0
Average (no of days) 65 66
Regulatory deadline (no. of days) 45 45
Investigated within 45 days (%) 42 % 3633 %
Source: Data from National Audit Offi  ce Report, Prime Minister’s Offi  ce.
Th e volume of reported irregularities stood at a relatively low level in the pe-
riod 2004 – 2008; however, it rocketed in 2009. Th e number of cases grew fi vefold, 
and the rate of assistance impacted by irregularities soared eightfold. A steady rise 
of irregularities followed, and by the end of the programming period a strong con-
centration became apparent in the economic development and regional operational 
programmes. Recovery rates ranged from 8 %34 to 157 % across the entire program-
ming architecture.35
At present, comparisons are hard to make, as mass-scale project implementa-
tion started only in 2016 and the fi rst irregularity was noted on 10 May 2016.
33 However, the value for the rate of investigations accomplished within 50 days is 54 %.
34 Economic Development OP.
35 Outstanding recoveries were subject to penalty interest rates.
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Table 2
Breakdown of irregularities in the period 2014 – 2020
Operational Programme Percentage of irregularities
Economic Competitiveness and Innovation OP 66
Human Resource Development 4
Transport (all public procurement) 7
Environment (all public procurement) 7
Public Administration 3
Territorial and Settlement Development 9
Competitive Central Hungary 4
Total 100
Source: Based on data from the Prime Minister’s Offi  ce, 31 January 2018
As the above table illustrates, the spread of irregularities across the operational 
programmes is rather uneven, the Economic Competitiveness and Innovation OP 
holds a dominant share of irregularity cases. Th is is partly due to the quick start of 
this programme inducing the launch of a large number of projects as well as the par-
ticular diffi  culties (bankruptcy, liquidation, ownership transformation etc.) private 
sector benefi ciaries struggle with.
2.5 Sources of irregularities
Sources of irregularities have long fallen into a limited number of categories. Most of 
the irregularities are linked to public procurement (29 %) and ineligible expenditure 
(30 %). Th e present over-representation of the Economic Competitiveness and In-
novation OP came with the rising challenges (e.g. liquidation, bankruptcy and oth-
er processes) benefi ciary fi rms have to struggle with. Breach of public procurement 
rules account for a very high proportion of repayments. Operational programmes 
with public-sector benefi ciaries and large-scale procurements are particularly “vul-
nerable” to non-compliance. Since the mid-2000s, the nature of non-conformity has 
moved from the employment of inadequate procedures to restricting competition 
and sound fi nancial management, its lack of defi nition re-occurs with each pub-
lic procurement audit. Neither pure reference to this principle nor the observation 
of reduced competition helps to understand how the fundamental concept should 
translate into practice. Auditors’ observations on restrictions to equal and fair com-
petion display great procedural variations in terms of the size of evidenced market 
interest, the signs of any perceived inhibit to entry (e.g. ex-ante settlement request, 
appeals) or the ratio of the planned vs. actual tender value (Tátrai and Nyikos 2012). 
Growing concerns are refl ected in the paper36 compiled by the Legal Interpretation 
36 Supreme Court 2015.El.II.JGY.E.1.1. Jurisdiction Practice in Public Procument, Summary Report 
by the ad-hoc Legal Interpretation Analysing Group of the Supreme Court.
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Analysing Group of the Supreme Court, noting that the principle of sound fi nan-
cial management, ingrained in Hungary’s Public Procurement Law, is diffi  cult to 
interpret. It is not applicable as a general clause, it is of economic rather than legal 
content, and it does not trigger a legal impact. Appraising the soundess of manage-
ment practices is subjective, which cannot be scientifi cally or empirically measured, 
its boundaries cannot be defi ned. Th erefore, attaching legal consequences to this 
criterion is perceived as a rather ambitious attempt.37
Market prices have recently received critical audit observations. For purchases 
via public procurement, the outcome of the competition is generally accepted as the 
market price. For items / services with a value below the public procurement thresh-
old, a diff erent approach has been taken. Th e Hungarian rules on eligibility dictate 
that any expenditure which the benefi ciaries submit must follow the market prices. 
A failure to off er hard evidence on the adequacy of the prices provokes the rejec-
tion of the expense as ineligible. A range of instruments has recently been put in to 
help benefi ciaries, simplify the assessment of the price range and reduce audit risks. 
Th ese include the use of three independent quotes, the employment of capped bud-
get categories, unit prices or reference to offi  cial rates. Ensuring an acceptable price 
range needs robust checks and proper documentation of the probings. At present, a 
20 % departure from the perceived market price is allowed.
Th e risk of irregularities remained high as the root problems are manifold. 
Grant culture inspires benefi ciaries to maximise funding opportunities. Market 
prices constantly change and refl ect the information on the availability of sizeable 
public funds. Labour market changes, lack of skilled workers and demand propelled 
by the cyclical nature of programmes have led to rising costs. Comparisons with 
previous public tenders are becoming irrelevant.
Th ese complications are evidently not unique to Hungary. It is tempting to 
address the symptoms, and fi nancial corrections imposed on the Member States in-
deed do so, nonetheless only fi nding and reacting to the root of the problems could 
radically improve the regularity of the funds.
3. The “new” approach: Rule of law
Aft er analysing the evolution and the particular Hungarian context and under-
standing the importance of the proper and legal functioning of the implementation 
system, this chapter takes stock of the main considerations for the future of the ir-
regularity system with a view to the new rule of law conditionality under the 2020+ 
Cohesion Policy.
37 The report also suggests that other pieces of legislation contain very specifi c norms for the use of 
public funds.
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Th e use of conditionalities in Cohesion Policy has been signifi cantly extended 
(Nyikos 2014) to date, containing macroeconomic conditionality, ex-ante condi-
tionalities (and are proposed to be further widened in the next period with the in-
fringement conditionality). Th e exisiting conditionalities and legislative provisions 
dictate the obligations which the implementing entities of the Member States, in-
cluding the organs in charge of managing irregularities, have to satisfy, and should 
these duties be in need of enforcement, the Commission is equipped with eff ective 
instruments to terminate or suspend payments. For the regular implementation of 
Cohesion Policy, the proper functioning of the relevant institutional system has al-
ways served as a pre-requisite. Due to irregularities, in a broader sense the judiciary 
has also formed part of the implementation system (Nyikos 2019). Nonetheless, the 
European Commission has not previously examined the functioning of the courts 
in relation to the irregularity and recovery cases, although embedding these func-
tions into the national legislation has gone beyond being a solely Hungarian prob-
lem (Talaga and Nyikos 2014).
Th e 2021 – 2027 legislative proposals present a new rule of law conditionality38 
as a stand-alone, cross-cutting requirement applicable to all EU budget expendi-
ture, including Cohesion Policy. Th e provisions comprise conditions specifi c to Co-
hesion Policy as well as EU legal principles, constitutional rights and requirements 
deriving from the concept of the rule of law. As mentioned earlier, there has been 
no attempt by the European Commmission so far to subject the exercising of the 
judicial functions in Cohesion Policy related cases to scrutiny. Th e proposal pro-
voked both political and legal debates, principal concerns relate to the transparency, 
clarity and objectivity of the rule of law provisions.
Benefi ciaries enjoy the constitutional right to fi le a claim in an independent 
and impartial court. Th e absence of this protection would violate their constitution-
al rights and may also raise fears among them about the political infl uence which at 
the second level of the administrative disputes’ resolution may occur. Th e scrutiny 
of the legality of the sanctions by the independent judiciary bears essential impor-
tance, as recorded in the European Convention of Human Rights, the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the Treaties and refl ected by Court 
practice.39 Th e existing instruments, the actual Commission and Court practices 
raise dilemmas about what value added the new provisions will off er. Furthermore, 
the present wording of the legislative proposal does not off er suffi  cient clarity on 
the nature, gravity and scope of the generalised defi ciency which may trigger the 
Commission’s intervention; regulatory conditions, instead of promoting the noble 
goal of safeguarding the rule of law, may become a powerful political instrument. 
38 COM (2018)324 fi nal, Rule of law conditionality proposal.
39 Court Decision C-619 / 18 R (19 October 2018).
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Appropriately, the opinion of the European Court of Auditors confi rms the need for 
substantiating a judgment of defi ciency with specifi c criteria.40
4. Discussion
Th is chapter provides for a short summary of the signifi cant points made earlier in 
relation to the key milestones the evolution of the irregularity system in Hungary 
has shown so far and the outstanding issues yet to be resolved.
Since its fi rst programming period, Hungary has notably stabilised its irreg-
ularity structures and mechanisms, including the continued development of the 
regulatory and administrative framework. Th is progress has been largely inspired 
by the growing exposure to administrative and fi nancial sanctions. Accordingly 
continued eff orts contributed to improved institutional capacity and the introduc-
tion of specifi c instruments and techniques to deal with high-risk areas, whereas 
the launch of an appeal system advanced the protection of benefi ciaries. However, 
the process is far from complete. Th e long-known need to resolve the nature of the 
legal relationship between grantee and the grant provider has become inevitable. 
Th e Hungarian appeal system needs to be re-examined, since available administra-
tive dispute procedures do not replace the full-scale judicial oversight, a last-resort 
protection in the Constitution.
Th e EU legislation has dictated the ingrained authority of the European Com-
mission to discontinue the transfer of Cohesion Policy funds, should systemic short-
coming be recognised in a Member State. Discussions on the irregularity and appeal 
systems have been ongoing between the Commission and the Hungarian Authori-
ties, yet the approach to accessible dispute resolution and justice has presented am-
biguity and inconsistencies over time.
Th is leads to the rule-of-law principle, the employment of which requires ut-
most precision in terms of the clarity of specifi c requirements Member States are 
obliged to fulfi l when using Cohesion Policy funds. In addition, the in-depth analy-
sis and addressing of the root problems, which repeatedly invoke irregularities, yet 
awaits. Th e current fi nancial implementation and control regime (annuality) has 
not rectifi ed the long-lasting diffi  culties. Non-conformity has not ceased to trouble 
managing authorities. Out of fear to induce systemic irregularities if non-compli-
ance of spending is revealed aft er the annual accounts are submitted, they reduce 
their risks by excluding the feared items. Treating a symptom is very far from fi xing 
the problem. Without the latter, national budget will bear the burden; legal uncer-
tainty will not be removed either.
40 Court of Auditors Opinion No 1 / 2018 (pursuant to Article 322(1)(a) TFEU) concerning the 
proposal of 2 May 2018 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
protection of the Union’s budget in case of generalised defi ciencies as regards the rule of law in 
the Member States (2018 / C 291 / 01).
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Last but not least simplifi cation and compliance strongly correlate. New meth-
odologies are required to provoke the regulatory concept at both EU and national 
levels, identify redundancies and push forward towards a really radical cutback of 
red tape.
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